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Abstract
Convolutional neural networks memorize part of their training data,
which is why strategies such as data augmentation and drop-out are em-
ployed to mitigate overfitting. This paper considers the related question of
“membership inference”, where the goal is to determine if an image was
used during training. We consider it under three complementary angles.
We show how to detect which dataset was used to train a model, and in
particular whether some validation images were used at train time. We
then analyze explicit memorization and extend classical random label ex-
periments to the problem of learning a model that predicts if an image
belongs to an arbitrary set. Finally, we propose a new approach to infer
membership when a few of the top layers are not available or have been
fine-tuned, and show that lower layers still carry information about the
training samples. To support our findings, we conduct large-scale experi-
ments on Imagenet and subsets of YFCC-100M with modern architectures
such as VGG and Resnet.
1 Introduction
The widespread adoption of convolutional neural networks (LeCun et al., 1990)
(ConvNets) for most recognition tasks, was triggered by the advance of Krizhevsky
et al. (2012) in image classification and subsequent deep architectures (Simonyan
& Zisserman, 2014; He et al., 2016). Several works have analyzed these ar-
chitectures from different perspectives. Zeiler & Fergus (2014) have proposed
DeconvNet to vizualize filter activations. Lenc & Vedaldi (2015) analyze their
equivariance. Mahendran & Vedaldi (2015) show how to invert them and syn-
thetize images maximizing the response of different classes. Ulyanov et al.
(2017) analyze the image priors implicitly defined by ConvNets.
All these works increase our understanding of ConvNets, but the complex
issue of overfitting and its relationship to optimization are still not fully un-
derstood. Several strategies are routinely used to avoid overfitting, such as
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`2-regularization through weight decay (Krogh & Hertz, 1991), dropout (Sri-
vastava et al., 2014), and importantly, data augmentation (Behpour et al., 2017;
Dwibedi et al., 2017; Paulin et al., 2014). Yet few works (Zhang et al., 2016;
Yeom et al., 2018) have analyzed the interplay of overfitting and memorization
of training images in high-capacity classification architectures. Specifically, we
are not aware of such an analysis for a modern ConvNet such as ResNet-101
learned on Imagenet.
In this paper, we consider the privacy issue of membership inference, i.e.,
we aim at determining if a specific image or group of images was used to train
a model. This question is important to protect both the privacy and intellectual
property associated with images. For ConvNets, the privacy issue was recently
considered by Yeom et al. (2018) for the small MNIST and CIFAR datasets.
The authors evidence the close relationship between overfitting and privacy
of training images. This is reminiscent of prior membership inference attacks,
which employ the output of the classifier associated with a particular example
to determine whether it was used during training or not (Shokri et al., 2016).
This is related to Torralba & Efros (2011), who showed that a classifier can
determine with high accuracy if an image comes from a dataset or another
by exploiting the bias inherent to datasets. We discuss this relationship and
show that we can detect whether a given network has been trained on some
of the validation images. This has a concrete application for machine-learning
benchmarks: scores are often reported on a validation set with public labels,
allowing a malicious or gawky competitor to artificially inflate the accuracy by
training on validation images. Our test detects if it is the case, even if only part
of the validation set is leaked to the training set.
We provide a qualitative upper bound on the capacity of popular convo-
lutional networks to memorize a given number of images. More precisely, we
construct a binary classifier as a drop-in replacement of the last layer, whose
response is the membership test. Our tests carried out on VGG-16 (Simonyan
& Zisserman, 2014) and ResNet-101 (He et al., 2016) evidence different memo-
rizing capabilities depending on the number of images and the amount of data
augmentation (flip, cropping).
Finally, we propose a new setting for membership inference that only con-
siders intermediary layers of a network, thus extending membership inference
to transferred and fine-tuned networks, that have become ubiquitous. Our
membership inference does not require the last layer(s) of the original ConvNet
to perform the test. This is important because, in many contexts, image recog-
nition systems are built upon a trunk trained on a dataset and then fine-tuned
for another task. Examples include Mask-RCNN (He et al., 2017) and models
used for fine-grained recognition (Hariharan & Girshick, 2017). In both cases
there are not enough training samples to train a full network: only the last lay-
ers of the networks are fine-tuned. In summary, our paper makes the following
contributions:
• A simple statistical test to detect the “signature” of a dataset in a trained
convnet, and to detect if validation images where used to train the model
(leakage).
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• An empirical analysis of the explicit memorization capabilities of the ResNet
and VGG architectures at a much larger scale than previously reported.
We evaluate the factors impacting the memorization capabilities such as
the number of images “stored” in the network and the equivariance hy-
potheses in data augmentation.
• A membership inference test that detects if an image was used to train the
trunk of a network. To our knowledge, it is the first work on membership
inference that attacks intermediate layers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Sec-
tion 3 evaluates the capacity of ConvNets to memorize a given set of images.
Section 4 considers the problem of determining if a particular dataset, e.g., the
validation set, was used during training. Section 5 focuses on detecting if a
particular image has been used for training without accessing the network’s
output layer.
2 Related work & datasets
Our work is related to the topics of overfitting and memorization capabilities of
neural network architectures, which are able to perfectly discriminate random
outputs in some cases (MacKay, 2002; Zhang et al., 2016). In the following, we
distinguish explicit from implicit memorization (also called “unintended mem-
orization” (Carlini et al., 2018) in natural language processing systems).
Explicit memorization. Neural network are capable of memorizing any
random pattern. This property was analyzed in MacKay (2002) for the single
layer case. In MacKay’s setup, the sender and receiver agree beforehand on a
set of vectors (xi)ni=1 ∈ Rd. To transmit an arbitrary sequence of binary labels
y1, . . . , yn, the sender learns a single-layer neural network that predicts the yi
from xi, and sends its weights to the receiver. The receiver labels the points
x1, . . . , xn with the transmitted neural network to reconstruct the labels. The
VC-dimension of this 1-layer model is d, so the model can fit perfectly as long
as n ≤ d. MacKay extends this bound by showing that the sender can, with
high probability, find a neural network fitting the output if n ≤ 2d, and that it
is almost impossible to fit the model for n > 2d. The estimated capacity of this
neural network is thus 2 bits per parameter.
Determining the practical memorization capacity of ConvNets is not triv-
ial. A few recent works (Zhang et al., 2016; Yeom et al., 2018) evaluate how a
network can fit random labels. Zhang et al. (2016) replace true labels by ran-
dom labels and show that popular ConvNets can perfectly fit them in simple
cases, such as small datasets (CIFAR10) or Imagenet without data augmenta-
tion. Krueger et al. (2017) extend their analysis and argue in particular that
the effective capacity of ConvNets depends on the dataset considered. In a pri-
vacy context, Yeom et al. (2018) exploit this memorizing property to watermark
networks. As a side note, random labeling and data augmentation have been
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used for the purpose of training a network without any annotated data (Doso-
vitskiy et al., 2014; Bojanowski & Joulin, 2017). Our paper is also related to few
works (Kraska et al., 2017; Iscen et al., 2017) that learn indexes as an alternative
to traditional structures such as Bloom Filters or B-trees. In particular, Kraska
et al. (2017) show that in some cases, neural nets outperform cache-optimized
B-tree on real-world data. These works exploiting explicit memorization of
neural networks are reminiscent of works (Hopfield, 1982; Personnaz et al.,
1986; Hinton et al., 1986; Plate, 1995) on associative memories and, more gen-
erally, distributed representations.
Implicit memorization and privacy risk in learning systems. Ateniese
et al. (2015) state: “it is unsafe to release trained classifiers since valuable information
about the training set can be extracted from them”. The problem that we address
in this paper, i.e., to determine whether an image or dataset has been used for
training, is related to the privacy implications of machine learning systems.
They were discussed in the context of support vector machines (Rubinstein
et al., 2009; Biggio et al., 2014). In the context of differential privacy (Dwork
et al., 2006), recent works (Wang et al., 2016; Bassily et al., 2016) suggest that
guaranteeing privacy requires learning systems to generalize well, i.e., to not
overfit. Note that there are systems providing differential privacy but that still
leak information (Ateniese et al., 2015; Balu et al., 2014).
Membership Inference in images. A few recent works (Abadi et al., 2016;
Hayes et al., 2017; Shokri et al., 2016; Long et al., 2018) have addressed “mem-
bership inference” for images: determine whether an image has been used for
training or not. Yeom et al. (2018) discuss how privacy, that can be broken
by membership inference, is connected to overfitting. Long et al. (2018) ob-
serve that some training images are more vulnerable than others and propose
a strategy to identify them. Hayes et al. (2017) analyze privacy issues arising
in generative models. Most of these works were evaluated on small datasets
like CIFAR10, or larger datasets but without data augmentation. Our work
aims at being closer to realistic conditions. In the following, the analysis of a
pre-trained network will be called “attack” performed by an “attacker”.
Dataset bias and inference. Torralba & Efros (2011) evidence that a simple
classifier can predict with high accuracy which dataset an image comes from.
Tommasi et al. (2017) show that this bias still exists with ConvNets. In the next
section of this paper, we re-visit this problem by proposing a dataset inference
method derived from an elementary membership inference test.
Datasets used in our study. We use will several public image collections
throughout our paper. Imnet1k refers to the subset of Imagenet (Deng et al.,
2009; Russakovsky et al., 2015) used during the ILSVRC-12 challenge. It con-
sists of 1000 balanced classes, split in a training set (1.2M images) and a valida-
tion set (50k images). We use the regular split between train and val and denote
them by Imnet1k-train and Imnet1k-val, respectively. Imnet22k refers to the
full Imagenet dataset. It is built in the same way as Imnet1k, but with 21783 un-
balanced classes. Yfcc100M (Thomee et al., 2016) contains 99.2M photos that
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have not been collected for image classification and thus are not representing
specific classes or visual concepts. Tiny images (Torralba et al., 2008) consists
of 79M low-resolution images. CIFAR10 is a subset of Tiny that has been la-
belled for image classification. In our study, it is important that the dataset
does not contain duplicate images or images that overlap between the train
and the test set. We have sanitized the datasets to avoid this problem using
GIST descriptors and similarity search, see Appendix B in the supplemental
material for details.
3 Explicit memorization – network capacity
In this section, we explicitly train neural networks to memorize a given subset
of images, so that it can decide whether an image is in its memory or not at
test time. We design a model fθ that distinguishes a set of in images from out
images, where images unseen during training are out.
We repurpose the classification layer of standard models to output a binary
label, depending on whether the image must be remembered or not. Our archi-
tecture plays an equivalent role to the discriminator in Generative Adversarial
Networks (GAN): it needs to discriminate between positive and negative im-
ages. In our case, negative images are a large pool of images instead of the
generated images in GANs. Zhang et al. (2016) show that ConvNets are able to
overfit almost any random labelling of their input data, but in their experiment,
the output for unseen images is undefined.
3.1 Information-theoretic capacity
We train our model to predict 1 for a set of positive imagesP , and 0 for all other
(negative) images N . We assume that N represent a large image distribution,
so n = |P|  |N |, and we note N = |P| + |N |. There are two notions of
capacity relevant to our analysis: the capacity of a neural network, and the
capacity needed to store a number n of images among a larger set of size N .
We assume, following MacKay’s analysis, that the capacity of a neural network
is well approximated by its number of parameters. Assuming images have
consecutive ids, it is sufficient to store the subset of ids of the positive images,
which requires a capacity:
C(n) = log2
(
N
n
)
≈ n log2
(
N
n
)
+
n
log(2)
, (1)
where the approximation holds for n N . This number scales almost linearly
in the number of positive examples n, and logarithmically in the number of
negatives.
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Figure 1: In/out classification performance (train) on Tiny, for varying image
subsets and number of images. The colors indicate the type of data augmen-
tation: purple=none, green=flip, cyan=flip+crop±1, orange=flip+crop±2. The
vertical line shows the number of positive images n such that C(n) is the num-
ber of parameters of the network.
3.2 Empirical analysis on tiny images
TinyNet. We design a family of ConvNets with 4 convolutional layers and
2 fully-connected layers that take 32x32 images as input and output a binary
classification. There are 3 versions: TinyNet-1, (90k parameters), TinyNet-2
(300k parameters) and TinyNet-3 (2M parameters). Most parameters of these
models are in the first fully connected layer, as in VGG (cf. Appendix C).
Experimental setup. We use a subset of N = 15M images from Tiny for
these experiments. We randomly sample n images as positive examples, and
treat the rest as negatives. At each epoch, we feed a random sample of nega-
tives of the same size as the number of positives to the network. The reported
accuracy is measured on a balanced set of positives and negatives. We consider
four types of data augmentation: “none”, “flip” (random horizontal mirror-
ing), “flip+crop±1” (a random translation in {−1, 0,+1}2), “flip+crop±2”.
Discussion. Figure 1 shows the accuracy of the model as a function of the
number of positive images for all TinyNets. Instead of a sharp drop between
the over-capacity and the under-capacity regimes, we observe a smooth drop
as the number of positives increases. Empirically, this transition phase happens
when the number of samples reaches the theoretical capacity of the network.
As expected, data augmentation reduces the memorization capacity of the
network. For example, the accuracy of a network trained on n images with
flips is lower-bounded by the capacity of the same network trained on 2n im-
ages with no data augmentation. This lower bound is not tight, thanks to the
generalization capability of the ConvNet, which captures the patterns common
to an image and its symmetric. This generalization capability is obvious for
stronger augmentations: for example with “flip+crop±1” TinyNet-2 can iden-
tify 10k images with 90% accuracy, vs. 20k images without data augmentation,
while this requires to treat 18 augmented versions of each image similarly.
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Figure 2: Accuracy over iterations of the in/out training on Yfcc100M for dif-
ferent networks and amount of data augmentation (indicated by color: purple=
none, green = flip, cyan = flip+crop±5).
3.3 Experiments with large-scale architectures
In this section, we extend the explicit memorization experiments to VGG-16,
ResNet-18, and ResNet-101 networks with images coming from Yfcc100M. The
capacity of these networks is much larger than in the tiny setting: Resnet-18
has 11.7M parameters and VGG-16 has 140M.
We set an initial learning rate of 10−2 and divide it by 10 when the accu-
racy gets over 60%, and again at 90%. We run experiments using either the
center crop, or two data augmentations (flip, flip+crop±5). Figure 2 shows
convergence plots for several settings. Note, the x-axis is in epochs, that are
10× slower for n =100k images than n =10k images. The longest experiment
took 4 days on 4 GPUs . VGG-16 and ResNet-101 converge at approximately
the same number of epochs, irrespective of n. Data augmentation increases the
number of epochs required to converge, eg. for the ResNets, flip up to twice
more epochs to be trained. VGG is a more shallow and higher capacity net-
work; in general it converges faster and it handles crops better than the ResNet
variants.
The outcome of our analysis is that explicit memorization of a large amount
of images is possible, albeit more difficult with data augmentation. In real use
cases, the number of images that can be stored explicitly with perfect accuracy
is practically much lower than the number of network parameters. This set of
experiments provides an approximate upper-bound for the problem of mem-
bership inference: if a given model cannot perfectly remember a set of images
when trained to do so, it will likely not be able to remember all the images of
the training set when trained for classification.
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Figure 3: Left: Cumulative distribution of the maximum classification score
for a sample of 5000 images taken from 4 datasets. Imnet1k-train served as
the training set and therefore Imnet1k images (both train and val) have higher
confidence. Right: binary classification accuracy (%) of a sample of m ele-
ments from the training set Imnet1k-train w.r.t. three other datasets: Imnet1k-val
(solid), Imnet22k (dashed) and Yfcc100M (lines). The architecture is indicated
by the line color.
4 Dataset detection and leakage
In this section, we detect whether a group of samples or a dataset has been
used to train a model. This problem encompasses the particular case of dataset
bias (Torralba & Efros, 2011) and is more difficult, as we need to distinguish
datasets even if they share the same statistics, acquisition procedure and la-
belling process. For instance, we want to be able to determine if images from
the validation set of Imnet1k were used at train time.
Hypothesis and problem statement. We assume that there are two data
sources S1, S2 and each source Sj yields samples x
(j)
1 , x
(j)
2 , . . . , x
(j)
m . The attacker
is given access to a model fθ; in this paper, we assume fθ(x) is the maximal ac-
tivation of the softmax layer, aka. the confidence of the model. The cumulative
distribution of the confidence for a model trained on Imnet1k-train is shown in
figure 3: most samples coming from the source Imnet1k-train have a very high
confidence, while the distribution of the source Imnet1k-val is more balanced
and unrelated sources (Yfcc100M, Imnet22k) tend to have a more uniform dis-
tribution.
We consider two attack scenarii on the model fθ. In the first scenario, we
have a set of m samples that come from either S1 or S2 and we want to de-
termine which source they come from. In the second scenario, we want to
determine if the model has been trained with samples from a validation set,
and thus look at whether the two source distributions corresponding to the
validation and the test are different.
We compare confidence distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-
S) distance. Given two cumulative distributions F and G, the K-S distance is
dKS(F,G) = supx |F (x) − G(x)|. We use the K-S distance to determine if two
distributions are similar.
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4.1 Confidence as a signature of a dataset
In this section the samples x1, . . . , xm come from either source S1 or S2. The
attacker uses the following decision rule: compute the K-S distance between
x1, . . . , xm and S1 (resp. S2), and assign the samples to the closest source.
Results and observations. The results are reported in Figure 3. We can
distinguish Imnet1k-train from Yfcc100M with very few (10-20) samples. More
interestingly, the same number of samples allow us to separate Imnet22k from
Imnet1k-train, and with 500 images we can distinguish Imnet1k-train from Imnet1k-
val. This shows that, even with a relatively low number of images, an attacker
can determine that a given image collection was used for training. The figure
also shows that the test is easier for networks with a higher capacity, that tend
to overfit more.
4.2 Detecting leakage
We now assume that we are given a model for which we suspect that part of
the validation set was used for training (leakage). For a number of datasets (e.g.,
Imagenet, Pascal VOC), the labels of the validation set are publicly available,
and models are often compared using validation accuracy. A malicious person
could train a model using the training set and part of the validation set, and
then report validation accuracy to artificially inflate the performance of the
model.
The attack we propose is a two-sample K-S test to determine if leakage has
occurred or not. We assume that no sample from the test set has leaked (labels
are not public in most cases). The null hypothesis of our test is that the vali-
dation and test sets have the same distribution. We compute the K-S distance
between the validation and test sets, and reject the null hypothesis if this dis-
tance is high. The distance threshold t is set such that the null hypothesis is
incorrectly rejected with a low probability α, corresponding to the p-value. For
large samples, Smirnov’s estimate of the threshold corresponding to a p-value
of α is (Feller, 1949):
t = c(α)
√
n+m
nm
where c(α) =
√
−1
2
log
(α
2
)
. (2)
We ran experiments on Imagenet using Resnet-18 and VGG-16, with s ∈
{1, 2, 5, 10, 20} images per class of the validation set in addition to the training
set to fit the model. Table 1 reports the p-value of the different tests. We can see
that when 10 images per class are leaked, the K-S test predicts that leakage has
happened with a very high significance. When 5 images per class or less are
used, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and thus cannot claim that leakage
has happened.
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Table 1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on Imnet1k validation and test sets for var-
ious levels of leakage. The K-S test provides a level of significance (p-value)
rather than a yes/no answer. Lower values indicate high confidence that the
validation and test sets distributions are different, hinting that leakage has oc-
curred. If only 1 image per class of the validation set has leaked, we cannot
conclude from this test that there has been leakage. Conversely, when 10 im-
ages or more have leaked, we can conclude with high significance that leakage
has occurred.
Nb. of Images
# per class leaked Resnet-18 VGG-16
1 0.888 0.494
2 0.228 0.107
5 0.068 0.014
10 < 10−4 < 10−4
20 < 10−4 < 10−4
5 Implicit memorization & membership inference
This section tackles the more difficult problem of membership inference in
trained models. From a trained model and an image the attacker has to de-
termine whether the image was used to train the model. In our new setting,
upper layers are not available (due to e.g. finetuning on a downstream task).
We provide baselines for VGG16 and Resnet and extend the traditional attacks
to our setup.
The literature (Abadi et al., 2017) distinguishes two cases types of member-
ship inference: (1) all layers are available (all-layers), (2) only the final output
of the network is available (final-output). There is currently no attack that per-
forms substantially better in all-layers than in final-output. This seems counter-
intuitive but we confirmed it in preliminary experiments. Our new setup,
partial-layers, is adapted to transfer learning: only a certain number of bottom
layers are available for attack, the remaining layers were destroyed by retrain-
ing on an unrelated task. This task is more difficult than all-layers since it has
less parameters available, and thus more difficult than final-output.
5.1 Evaluation protocol and baselines
We assume that there are three disjoint sources of data: a public set, a private set,
and an evaluation set. A model is trained on the private set. The attacker has
access to the lower layers of this model and to the public set. After the attack
is carried out, the evaluation is ran on images from the private and evaluation
sets.
We divide Imnet1k equally into two splits (each with half of the images per
class). We hold out 50 images per class in the first split to form the evaluation
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set, and form the private set with the rest of this split. The second split is used
as the public dataset. We conduct the membership inference test by comparing
the prediction of the attack model on the private set and on the evaluation set.
For this purpose, we consider the two baseline methods.
Bayes rule. A simplistic membership inference attack is to predict that an
image comes from the training set if its class is predicted correctly, and from a
held-out set otherwise. We note ptrain (resp. ptest) the classification accuracy on
the training (resp. held-out) set, and assume a balanced prior on membership.
According to Bayes’ rule, the accuracy of the heuristic is (see Appendix A in
the supplementary material for the derivation):
pbayes = 1/2 + (ptrain − ptest)/2. (3)
Since ptrain ≥ ptest this heuristic is better than random guessing (accuracy 1/2)
and the improvement is proportional to the overfitting gap ptrain − ptest.
Maximum Accuracy Threshold (MAT). Yeom et al. (2018) propose an attack
on the loss value: a sample is deemed part of the training set if its loss is below
a threshold τ . If Ftrain (resp. Fheldout) is the cdf of the loss on the train (resp.
held out), the accuracy of the MAT is:
pthreshold = max
τ
1/2 + 1/2 (Ftrain(τ)− Fheldout(τ)) (4)
As Ftrain(τ) ≥ Fheldout(τ), this heuristic is also better than random guessing.
In practice, τ is estimated with samples or simulated by training models with
known train/heldout split.
5.2 Membership inference with a truncated network
In this section, we provide a simple method to attack networks in the partial-
layers setting. We use the available public data to retrain the missing layers,
and apply either the Bayes or the MAT attack, as if there was no fine-tuning
at all. We found this method to be more accurate than another variant that we
designed with shadow models (Shokri et al., 2016), as detailed in the supple-
mental material (Appendix E).
5.3 Experiments on large convnets
Classification models. We experiment with the popular VGG-16 (Simonyan
& Zisserman, 2014) and Resnet-101 (He et al., 2016) architectures. The private
model is learned in 90 epochs, with an initial learning rate of 0.01, divided by 10
every 30 epochs. Parameter optimization is conducted with stochastic gradient
descent with a momentum of 0.9, a weight decay of 10−4, and a batch size of
256. To assess the effect of data augmentation, we train different networks with
varying data augmentation: flip+crop±5, flip+crop, flip+crop+resize, or none.
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Table 2: Accuracy of membership inference attacks on the softmax layer of the
models (final-output). Data augmentation reduces the gap between the training
accuracy and the held-out accuracy, thus decreasing the accuracy of the Bayes
attack and the MAT attack.
Model Augmentation Bayes baseline MAT
Resnet101 None 76.3 90.4
Flip, Crop ±5 69.5 77.4
Flip, Crop 65.4 68.0
VGG16 None 77.4 90.8
Flip, Crop ±5 71.3 79.5
Flip, Crop 63.8 64.3
Table 3: Accuracy of membership inference attacks on intermediate layers of
Resnet-101 and VGG-16 models (partial-layers).
Last block corresponds to the softmax, and respectively the fully connected lay-
ers (for VGG-16) and the 4-th stage of Resnet (for Resnet-101).
Augmentation Truncate Resnet-101 VGG-16
None Softmax 73.4 74.8
Last block 53.1 51.7
Flip, Crop±5 Softmax 65.7 67.3
Last block 53.1 52.2
Flip, Crop Softmax 60.8 58.5
Last block 52.9 53.2
Attack models. We evaluate both the bayes and MAT methods to estimate
the performance on final-output. The results are shown in Table 2. As we can
see, it is possible to guess with a very high accuracy if a given image was used
to train a model when there is no data augmentation. Stronger data augmen-
tation reduces the accuracy of the attacks, that still remain above 64%.
The results of our attack in the more challenging partial-layers setting are
shown in Table 3. We can see that even without the last layers, it is possible to
infer training set membership of an image. The attack performance depends
on two factors: the layer at which the attack is conducted, and the data aug-
mentation used to train the original network. As expected, it is more difficult
to attack a network that has been trained with more data augmentation, or that
has only lower layers available. More importantly, these experiments show
that intermediary layers still carry out information about the images used for
training the model.
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6 Conclusion
We have investigated the memorization capabilities of neural networks from
different perspectives. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art networks
can remember a large number of images and distinguish them from unseen
images. We have analyzed networks specifically trained to remember a set of
images and the factors influencing their memorizing and convergence capabil-
ities. It is possible to determine whether an image set was used at training time,
even with full data augmentation. On the contrary, the accuracy of determin-
ing if a single image was used is low when considering full data augmentation
on a large training set such as Imagenet. This implies that data augmentation
is an effective privacy-preserving method. Our last contribution is a method
that detects training images better than chance even with no access to the last
layers, under limited data augmentation.
Final remark: The curious reader may have noticed that our title echoes
the one of a previous user study (Dhamija et al., 2000), in which the authors
discussed the feasibility of authenticating humans by their capabilities to rec-
ognize a set of images.
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Appendix A Probabilistic derivations
A.1 Bayes attack
LetC denote the event that the prediction of the neural network is correct and S
the random variable that indicates whether the sample comes from the training
set. We therefore have:
P(C = 1|S = 1) = ptrain, P(C = 1|S = 0) = ptest (5)
P(S = 1) =P(S = 0) = 1/2. (6)
The accuracy of Bayes attack is:
P(C = S) = P(C = 1 | S = 1)P(S = 1) (7)
+ P(C = 0 | S = 0)P(S = 0) (8)
=
1
2
(ptrain + 1− ptest). (9)
A.2 Equivalence between Kolmogorov-Smirnov and threshold
attacks
If we consider the particular case of a subset of m = 1 image, we show in this
section that the decision boundary induced by the K-S distance is the same
as the MAT described in Section 5.1. Yet there are two significant differences
between the K-S attack and the MAT: we consider confidence instead of the loss
value, and the optimal threshold is computed differently. Our attacks with
the K-S distance can therefore be seen as a generalization of the membership
inference proposed by Yeom et al. (2018).
We assume that we have two cumulative distributions F and G such that
∀x, F (x) ≥ G(x). We want to show that the K-S rule is equivalent to a threshold
rule. Denoting by δx the Dirac distribution centered on x, we have:
dKS(δx, F ) ≤ dKS(δx, G) (10)
⇐⇒ 1
2
− |F (x)− 1
2
| ≤ 1
2
− |G(x)− 1
2
| (11)
⇐⇒ |G(x)− 1
2
| ≤ |F (x)− 1
2
|. (12)
The two following cases are easy:
G(x) ≤ F (x) ≤ 1/2⇒ dKS(δx, F ) ≤ dKS(δx, G), (13)
F (x) ≥ G(x) ≥ 1/2⇒ dKS(δx, F ) ≥ dKS(δx, G). (14)
For the last case, the set I for which G(x) ≤ 1/2 ≤ F (x) is an interval. On
this interval, |F (x)−1/2|− |G(x)−1/2| = F (x)+G(x)−1. F +G is increasing,
and thus there exists a threshold τ such that for x ∈ I :
x ≤ τ ⇐⇒ dKS(δx, F ) ≤ dKS(δx, G). (15)
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Figure 4: Histogram of distances of the images of Imnet22k to their nearest
neighbor.
With Equations 13 and 14, Equation 15 extends to all x.
Appendix B De-duplicating the datasets
In this section, we describe the de-duplication processing applied to the datasets
used in explicit memorization experiments. This process ensures that near-
duplicate images do not get assigned different labels, and thus makes learning
and evaluation more reliable.
B.1 Description and matching of duplicates
We compare images using GIST (Oliva & Torralba, 2006), a simple hand-crafted
descriptor that was shown to perform well on moderate image transforma-
tions (Douze et al., 2009). We compute the approximate k-nearest neighbor
graph on each dataset using Faiss (Johnson et al., 2017). Figure 4 shows the
histogram of distances for the images of Imnet22k to their nearest neighbor: the
bin around [0, 10−2] contains more images than the following bin [10−2, 2.10−2],
which is due to duplicates in the dataset.
Images that are bit-wise exact are unambiguous duplicates – in fact they
are often already removed beforehand from the datasets because they are easy
to detect by computing a hash value on the content. Beyond this extreme
case, the notion of “duplicate” is ambiguous: images that are re-encoded, re-
sized, slightly cropped should be considered duplicates, but the case of larger
transformations is less obvious (e.g., photos of the same painting, consecutive
frames of a video).
B.2 Identification of connected components
We set a conservative arbitrary threshold of 0.001 to detect duplicate images,
and remove the edges of the k-nn graph that are above this threshold. We
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TinyNet 1 TinyNet 2 TinyNet 3
Figure 5: Tiny nets.
n11610437 bishop pine, bishop’s pine, Pinus muricata
n11619455 western larch, western tamarack, Oregon larch,
Larix occidentalis
n11621281 amabilis fir, white fir, Pacific silver fir, red silver fir,
Christmas tree, Abies amabilis
n11626826 red spruce, eastern spruce, yellow spruce, Picea
rubens
n11710827 cucumber tree, Magnolia acuminata
n11721642 lesser spearwort, Ranunculus flammula
n11722342 western buttercup, Ranunculus occidentalis
n11722621 cursed crowfoot, celery-leaved buttercup, Ranuncu-
lus sceleratus
n11753562 buffalo clover, Trifolium reflexum, Trifolium
stoloniferum
n11840476 desert four o’clock, Colorado four o’clock, mar-
avilla, Mirabilis multiflora
n11874081 yellow rocket, rockcress, rocket cress, Barbarea vul-
garis, Sisymbrium barbarea
n11882426 crinkleroot, crinkle-root, crinkle root, pepper root,
toothwort, Cardamine diphylla, Dentaria diphylla
n11887750 western wall flower, Erysimum asperum, Cheiran-
thus asperus, Erysimum arkansanum
n11889205 tansy-leaved rocket, Hugueninia tanacetifolia,
Sisymbrium tanacetifolia
... ...
Figure 6: Image that appears in the largest number of duplicate versions in
Imnet22k (72), with a few of the corresponding synsets.
compute the connected components, and keep a single image per connected
component.
For Imnet22k, the largest connected components are error images returned
by image banks like Flickr for missing entries. This is an artifact of how the
dataset was downloaded. The largest non-trivial cluster from Imnet22k is the
image of a flower in Figure 6, that appears in 72 different synsets. There seems
to be some disagreement on the species of this flower, along with plain bad
annotations.
B.3 Statistics
Table 4 shows some statistics on the duplicates identified by our simple ap-
proach. Imnet22k has 10.4 % duplicate images. In addition to these dupli-
cates, we removed 930,757 images that overlap with Imnet1k, which means
that Imnet1k is not a subset of Imnet22k in this paper. Within Imnet1k, we found
1 % duplicates, which seems small enough not to remove them. For Tiny, we
found 9.5 % duplicates and removed them, leaving the dataset with 71, 726, 550
unique images.
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Table 4: Duplicate statistics for the datasets we use.
Dataset # images # groups
Imnet22k 14,197,087 12,720,164
Imnet1k-train 1,281,167 1,267,936
Tiny 79,302,017 71,726,550
Appendix C TinyNet architectures
This appendix describes the convolutional architecture employed in Section
3.2 of the main paper to evaluate the capacity saturation and the influence of
training parameters and choices on this capacity.
The architectures includes from 3 convolutional layers for TinyNet1 to 4
for TinyNet2 and TinyNet3. The first convolutional layer is 5x5. Each con-
volutional layer is followed by a Rectifier Linear Unit activation. The fully
connected layer of TinyNet3 is larger than TinyNet2.
Appendix D Filters
n=100k, no augmentation n=100k, flip n=100k, flip+crop±2
Figure 7: Filters of the first convolutional layer (7x7, 64 filters) obtained when
learning to explicitly memorize if an image was used for training or not.
The filters of the first convolutional layer are easy to visualize and contain
interesting information on how the SGD optimized to the very first filter that
is applied on the image pixels (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Bojanowski & Joulin,
2017; Paulin et al., 2017). Figure 7 shows the filters obtained after training a
Resnet-18. The filters for 10k images are very noisy compared to the smooth
Gabor filters produced by supervised classifiers. This is probably due to the
large capacity of the network, that is able to quickly overfit the data and does
not need to update the filter weights beyond their random initialization. With
more images, the filters become more uniform, exhibiting some specialization.
Interestingly, for n=100k with crop augmentation the filters have a clear uni-
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Table 5: Accuracy of membership inference attacks before the softmax layer of
the models (partial-layers), using shadow models.
Model Augmentation Attack accuracy
Resnet101 None 60.6
Flip, Crop ±5 61.4
Flip, Crop 58.2
VGG16 None 73.8
Flip, Crop ±5 65.8
Flip, Crop 55.2
form color. This is required for the output to be less sensitive to translations of
up to 2 pixels.
Appendix E Shadow models
We evaluated the performance of shadow models on the partial-layers setting.
The setting is the following: we train 20 networks on the public dataset, each
time holding out a different subset of images. For each network, we can thus
compare the activations of train and held-out images. These activations are not
directly comparable between two different networks, because internal activa-
tions of a ReLU network have invariances (such as permutation of the neurons
or positive rescaling). To circumvent this issue, we learn a regression model
that maps activations between two networks, and thus align activations of
all the networks to the activations of the network under attack using the `2
loss. We then learn an attack model that predicts from the aligned activations
whether the image was seen by the network at train time.
The results are shown in Table 5. While performing better than random
guessing, shadow models underperform the attack methods shown in Table 3.
We believe that this is due to the complex processing involved in training
shadow models on intermediate activations (notably the regression model),
whereas the attacks of Section 5 are more straightforward to train.
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